Cet article répond aux critiques de Latour selon lesquelles Canguilhem, vénérant la science, était incapable d’en écrire l’histoire. Je soutiens, au contraire, que Canguilhem a poursuivi une philosophie critique qui cherche les limites de diverses pratiques, y compris celles des rationalités et idéologies scientifiques. Bien qu’il défende l’efficacité d’une pratique médicale scientifiquement informée, il en identifie également les limites en interprétant les mouvements anti-médicaux comme des réponses aux échecs d’une médecine considérée comme infaillible parce que scientifique. Pour Canguilhem, la pratique (...) médicale doit être comprise en elle-même plutôt que considérée comme une application de connaissances scientifiques. En conséquence, il s’intéresse aux sciences dans leur rapport à la pratique médicale. Pour répondre en détail à l’accusation de Latour, cet article étudie la préoccupation fondamentale de la philosophie critique de Canguilhem. S’il s’agissait d’établir quelque vérité, valeur par excellence de la science selon Canguilhem, alors il semble que la critique serait valable. Mais en considérant attentivement l’histoire de ses projets et de ses réalisations telle que racontée dans son discours de réception de la médaille d’or du CNRS en 1987, cet article soutient au contraire que sa philosophie critique ne vénère pas la science, mais trouve son orientation ailleurs. En accordant une attention particulière à son intérêt constant pour l’erreur, et à sa distinction entre l’erreur intellectuelle et les essais et erreurs de la vie, je soutiens que sa philosophie critique s’intéresse en fin de compte à l’action et à la promotion du courage requis par la vie humaine. (shrink)

Ricoeur’s reading of analytic philosophy is part of a philosophical plan that focuses on deepening his inquiry into various thematics, some theoretical in nature, others concerned with the history of philosophy. On the theoretical plane, Ricoeur’s interest in the analytic tradition is rooted in the problem of the relationship between language and the world; as regards the history of philosophy, he is interested in the shift from a transcendental philosophy to a contemporary philosophy that is concerned with the world of (...) experience and the actions of a fallible and capable human being. From this perspective, a possible way into a Ricœurian reading of analytic philosophy is through two authors: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Nelson Goodman. In both cases, Ricoeur does not so much oppose the approaches and results of an "analytic philosophy" to those of a "continental philosophy" as seek to renew his reflection on language, imagination, and reference. We can account for this evolution in two stages: first, we will focus on the comparison that Ricoeur makes between the philosophy of the later Husserl and the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein; second, we will reexamine Ricoeur’s reading of Goodman’s general theory of reference. Keywords: Analytic Philosophy, Imagination, Goodman, Language, Phenomenology, Reference, Wittgenstein. Résumé La lecture ricœurienne de la philosophie analytique sert un projet philosophique concentré sur l’approfondissement personnel d’un certain nombre de thématiques d’ordre théorique ou concernant l’histoire de la philosophie : sur le plan théorique, l’intérêt de Ricœur en direction de la tradition analytique s’ancre dans le problème de l’articulation entre le langage et le monde ; sur le plan d’un rapport à l’histoire de la philosophie, dans la question du passage d’une philosophie transcendantale à une philosophie contemporaine devant considérée de manière plus étroite le monde de l’expérience et des actions d’un homme faillible et capable. Dans cette perspective, une entrée possible dans une lecture ricœurienne de la philosophie analytique se joue à travers deux auteurs : Ludwig Wittgenstein et Nelson Goodman. Dans les deux cas, Ricœur confronte moins les approches et résultats d’une “philosophie analytique” à ceux d’une “philosophie continentale” qu’il ne cherche à renouveler sa réflexion sur le langage, l’imagination, et la référence. On pourra rendre compte de cette évolution à travers deux étapes : une première étape se concentrera sur la confrontation opérée par Ricœur entre la dernière philosophie de Husserl et la dernière philosophie de Wittgenstein ; lors d’une seconde étape, il s’agit de reconsidérer une lecture ricœurienne de la théorie générale de la référence de Goodman. Mots-clés: Goodman, Imagination, Langage, Phénoménologie, Philosophie analytique, Référence, Wittgenstein. (shrink)

En général, un agent peut dire ce qu’il est en train de faire sans l’observer au préalable, et il possède une certaine autorité sur ce qu’il en dit. Partant de ce fait, Elizabeth Anscombe a soutenu que la connaissance qu’un agent a de ses actions intentionnelles est un «savoir pratique» (practical knowledge) «sans observation». Cette thèse a été abondamment commentée, critiquée et reprise depuis la publication d’Intention il y a bientôt 70 ans. Ce qui a plus rarement été abordé est (...) l’étonnant parallèle entre ce que dit Anscombe à ce sujet, et certaines descriptions sartriennes de la conscience d’un agent intentionnel. Cet article tâchera de montrer que les pensées respectives de ce drôle de couple philosophique convergent sur l’idée que nous avons la capacité de dire ce que nous sommes en train de faire sans observation ni réflexion préalable. En critiquant une certaine image de l’intériorité de l'esprit, leur objectif commun est de rendre compte de cette conscience de soi toute particulière qui permet aux agents de savoir ce qu’ils font dans et par cette action même. Comment faut-il comprendre le rapport entre ces deux approches ? Sont-elles complémentaires ? Concurrentes ? Nous considérons qu’une réponse simple et tranchée à ces questions n’est pas possible d’avance, exige une étude comparative relativement poussée. Notre hypothèse est que le savoir pratique d’un agent est indissociable d’une certaine expérience de l’engagement pratique dans le monde que décrit Sartre. (shrink)

Hume recourt régulièrement à la métaphore selon laquelle nous projetons des valeurs sur le monde du fait des émotions que nous éprouvons. Cette métaphore projectiviste semble impliquer la non-existence des valeurs, et l’impossibilité d’une connaissance morale. Dans cet article, j’essaie de montrer que ces implications sont loin d’être évidentes, et qu’une lecture réaliste de Hume est également possible, qui permet notamment de rendre compte du rapport complexe que Hume entretient avec le rationalisme moral en particulier, et avec la connaissance (...) des valeurs de façon plus générale. (shrink)

En général, une personne sait ce qu’elle pense, veut, ou ressent, sans avoir besoin pour cela de s’appuyer sur des observations d’elle-même. En ce sens, la connaissance de soi semble bénéficier d’un privilège par rapport à la connaissance d’autrui, celui de pouvoir apparaître comme vraie sans être fondée sur l’observation et l’inférence. Ce privilège se nomme, après Wittgenstein, l’« autorité de la première personne ». Pour expliquer ce phénomène, la métaphysique traditionnelle a postulé, à l’instar du cogito cartésien, que (...) le sujet aurait une sorte d’accès direct à son intériorité que ne peut avoir autrui. Or, la plupart des philosophes contemporains rejettent l’idée d’intériorité « privée », mais ils ne s’accordent cependant pas sur l’explication qui devrait la remplacer. Ce chapitre se concentre sur la solution que Richard Moran apporte à ce problème. Moran reprend la thèse sartrienne selon laquelle pour savoir et dire ce que je pense, veux, ou vais faire, je suis obligé de me décider, de m’engager plutôt que de m’observer. En ce sens, soutient Moran, le trait distinctif de la connaissance de soi en première personne n’est pas tant un privilège qu’une responsabilité à assumer. Mais pour s’engager de façon responsable, ne faut-il pas chercher d’abord à se connaître ? Nous considérons la force de cette objection, soulevée par Ferdinand Alquié contre Sartre, et tâchons d’y répondre. Ce faisant, notre but est de montrer en quoi l’engagement d’une personne exige un rapport à soi sans équivalent dans ses rapports à autrui. (shrink)

How do we know ourselves? When it comes to our states of mind, it might seem that self-knowledge enjoys a privilege: I know what I'm thinking because I have immediate access to my mind. Inspired by Sartre, two American philosophers, Richard Moran and Charles Larmore, have argued that this idea fails to account for our singular relationship with our own minds. In addition to knowing ourselves through theoretical reflection, we are also capable of practical reflection. We can answer the question (...) of what we think in a practical way: through a decision or a commitment, rather than a self-interpretation. But what is the relationship between these two types of self-reflection? What should we do when they conflict? This book seeks to answer these questions. In so doing, it shows the importance of another path to self-knowledge hitherto left aside by analytic authors: phenomenological reflection on our experience of the world. -/- Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On peut répondre de façon pratique à la question de savoir ce qu’on pense : par une décision ou un engagement, plutôt qu’une interprétation de soi. Mais quel est le rapport entre ces deux types de réflexion sur soi ? Que faire lorsqu’elles entrent en conflit ? Ce livre cherche à répondre à ces questions. Ce faisant, il montre l’importance d’une autre voie vers la connaissance de soi jusqu’à présent laissée de côté par les auteurs analytiques : la réflexion phénoménologique sur notre expérience du monde. (shrink)

L’expression de « greffe de l’herméneutique sur la phénoménologie » utilisée par Ricœur a souvent été reprise pour caractériser la phénoménologie herméneutique ricœurienne ou aborder ces champs de la phénoménologie et de l’herméneutique à partir de l’exemple ricœurien. Or, on peut penser que cette expression a été mal comprise et, partant, a pu conduire à divers malentendus concernant l’approche ricœurienne dans son rapport à la phénoménologie et l’herméneutique. Si le terme de greffe induit et renvoie à une différenciation de (...) deux méthodes et domaines, au sens d’une méthode et d’un domaine qui s’ajouteraient et complèteraient une autre méthode et un autre domaine, c’est moins la différence entre phénoménologie et herméneutique qui est engagée que celle entre une origine phénoménologique de l’herméneutique ricœurienne et le projet d’une anthropologie philosophique. Il est caractéristique que cette visée ne soit pas prise en compte par des critiques se réclamant d’un ancrage et d’une expertise soit en phénoménologie soit en herméneutique, révélant alors certaines limitations dans une approche de la philosophie ricœurienne. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de revenir sur le concept de lecture dans _Temps et récit _de Paul Ricœur, à travers les notions de triple mimèsis et de refiguration, en lien avec un cheminement antérieur concernant la question de l’herméneutique et la tradition phénoménologique. Tout en étant tributaire des développements en herméneutique philosophique depuis Gadamer, la lecture, chez Ricœur, fonctionnerait comme un paradigme permettant de relier les plans de l’interprétation et de la réception constitutifs de l’expérience esthétique. Par-là se jouent (...) des analyses venant complexifier un cadre philosophique initial et rendant possible une extension du paradigme donné à des domaines non-verbaux ou non-linguistiques. Cet article s’articule autour de deux parties. Dans une première partie, il s’agit de préciser le cadre général de l’herméneutique ricœurienne, la réception qui a été faite de _Temps et récit_, et le caractère ouvert du rapport entre refiguration et temporalité. Dans une second... (shrink)

Résumé Le cinéma peut être considéré comme un exemple particulièrement pertinent et instructif d’un discours et d’une pratique rapportables à chacun des trois grands domaines de l’imagination selon Ricœur – discours, articulation entre un niveau théorique et un niveau pratique, et imaginaire social. Tout en ayant pour objectif de se concentrer sur ce dernier niveau, une approche plus complète des notions de récit filmique et d’imaginaire social en venant de Ricœur requiert de traverser de nouveau les deux autres niveaux. Il (...) est notamment nécessaire de retrouver les termes d’une philosophie ricœurienne de l’imagination dans l’articulation entre mise en intrigue et représentation qui s’opère depuis Temps et récit et une approche ultérieure de la notion de récit filmique. Un rapport critique à l’imaginaire social et politique peut finalement être retrouvé à travers le cinéma. Il s’agit toutefois de comprendre le passage d’un positionnement critique hérité de la tradition philosophique à un mouvement critique interne aux pratiques cinématographiques: tout en prenant en compte la notion de récit, ce mouvement critique peut mettre en avant, de manière nouvelle, la notion d’image, contribuant à sa revalorisation au sein d’une philosophie de l’imagination. La dernière partie de cet article s’intéresse notamment au rapport privilégié entre cinéma et historicité. Mots-clés: Image, imaginaire social, historicité, mise en intrigue, récit filmique, représentation.Cinema can be considered a particularly relevant and instructive example of a discourse and practice that refer back to each of the three great domains of imagination identified by Ricœur—discourse, articulation between a theoretical level and a practical level, and the social imaginary. While the aim of this article is to focus on the third level, a more comprehensive approach to the ideas of cinematic narrative and social imagination, drawn from Ricœur, requires us to go through the other two levels again. It is particularly necessary to find the terms of a Ricœurian philosophy of imagination in the articulation between emplotment and representation, operative since Time and Narrative, and a later approach to the notion of cinematic narrative. A critical relationship to the social and political imaginary can eventually be found through cinema. But, it is a matter of understanding a transition from a critical stance inherited from the philosophical tradition to a critical movement internal to cinematic practices: while taking into account the notion of narrative, this critical movement can bring to the fore, in a new way, the notion of image, contributing to its reappraisal within a philosophy of imagination. The last section of the article is particularly interested in the special relationship between cinema and historicity. Keywords: Image, Social Imagination, Historicity, Emplotment, Cinematic Narrative, Representation. (shrink)

Charles Renouvier se bat contre les mystères et la métaphysique en utilisant la méthode scientifique. Il appuie son néocriticisme sur l'esprit de la science. Il n'omet pas d'étudier les premiers principes des sciences, les notions de phénomène et de loi, les catégories. Il articule son phénoménisme entre les catégories de relation, d'où découle l'absurdité de l'infini actuel, et de personne, toute chose étant par le biais de représentations. Il use des principes de relativité et de contradiction, propose un classement des (...) sciences, prenant en compte ses principes et posant la critique comme tronc commun des sciences. Il voit l'objet des mathématiques dans le rapport du multiple à l'un, et le nombre comme un tout d'unités. Sa loi du nombre lui permet de sortir des antinomies kantiennes, de penser les nombres négatifs et fractionnaires. Il analyse les concepts élémentaires de la géométrie, il présente les enjeux du calcul des probabilités et se positionne par rapport aux géométries imaginaires, tout cela en vue de débarrasser les mathématiques de toute métaphysique. Il fait valoir l'hypothèse scientifique dans les sciences expérimentales, s'interroge sur les notions de matière et de force. Considérant la place de la liberté et de la volonté en l'homme, il y voit une différence spécifique d'avec l'animal. Il montre le lien entre croyance et savoir, et il milite pour une religion raisonnée et un progrès moral."--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Introduction Nous aborderons ici le problème de l?intentionnalité des sentiments et du statut de leurs corrélats, les valeurs. La thèse « standard » en la matière, que l?on trouve aussi bien chez Brentano que chez Husserl, avec néanmoins des nuances significatives sur lesquelles nous aurons à revenir, veut que ces actes de l?affectivité s?édifient sur la base des représentations, considérées comme les conditions de l?apparaître en général. Pour Brentano, tout acte psychique est ou suppose une représentation comme rapport à (...) un objet distinguant les phénomènes psychiques des phénomènes physiques. Les phénomènes psy­chiques se distribuent, on le sait, en représentations, jugements et émotions, et la représentation sert de présupposition et de motivation aux deux autres types d?actes. Les actes de représentation sont indépendants, alors que les actes de jugement et d?émotion (amour et haine) en sont dépendants. Ce n?est que sur la base d?une présentation initiale d?un quelque chose, qu?un juge­ment ou une appréciation peuvent advenir. Le jugement et l?appréciation portent par conséquent sur les « choses » présentées dans l?acte de la repré­sentation, qui donne accès à un contenu en général. Il semble que Husserl conserve un schéma similaire, du moins en ce qui concerne les actes affec­tifs, car l?on sait qu?il récuse la thèse générale de la présupposition de la représentation en ce qui. (shrink)

Le tournant du XVIIe au XVIIIe siècle est une période décisive pour l’histoire de la chimie qui passe de la reconnaissance institutionnelle à la contestation de son fondement théorique, pour apparaître au final comme la seule partie de la Physique à pouvoir prétendre atteindre la « vérité certaine ». Ce qui se joue alors n’est rien de moins que la redéfinition de ses principes, à savoir son socle de vérités sur lequel s’appuie la science chimique. Cette période est en fait (...) la dernière étape de l’évolution du rapport entre les deux dimensions – théorique et pratique – dans lesquelles se déploie la chimie, qui a vu, par le développement de l’usage des principes dits seconds, l’ensemble des principes chimiques entrainé vers un réalisme empirique, ayant pour effet d’ôter de la chimie toute cohérence théorique. Aussi l’apparition du mécanisme – pas plus celui de Boyle – n’est-il en réalité responsable du bouleversement que connaît la chimie ; elle n’est pas davantage responsable de sa régénération au tout début du XVIIIe siècle. La conscience de la faiblesse théorique de la chimie va devenir pour elle promesse de vigueur théorique sur la base de ce qui représente sa force : l’expérience. À la suite de la perte de ce qui fut certitude, le chimiste devient un être à ré-instruire. Un chimiste tel que Samuel Cottereau Du Clos illustre parfaitement le passage d’une science chimique comme connaissance des principes à une chimie comme science cette fois du vraisemblable. (shrink)

This study examines the outcomes of a four-year faculty learning community (FLC) that aimed to transform departmental ethics curriculum by supporting Earth Sciences faculty members as they ethically inquired into their teaching of ethics and refined existing courses in alignment with an Integrated Community-Engaged Learning and Ethical Reflection (ICELER) framework. We present ethnographic case studies that unpack processes through which three faculty members transformed undergraduate courses. We assembled case studies by triangulating interview data, course artifacts, and faculty reflections. We examine (...) how faculty (1) built awareness around teaching ethics, (2) took responsibility for and made judgments about teaching ethics, (3) experimented by designing and implementing ICELER-inspired courses, and (4) interrogated the outcomes of their ethics teaching, utilizing findings to enhance awareness and revise courses. The paper closes by introducing a model detailing how instructors inquire into ethics teaching and how model components might inspire future educational practice and research. (shrink)

What if "liberal democracy" were a contradiction in terms? This book distinguishes liberalism from democracy to defend a Rancirean vision of impure politics. Disclosing Rancire's refusal of ontology as political, The Lessons of Rancire enacts a critical theory beyond unmasking and a democratic politics beyond liberalism.

30th Nov. and 1st Dec. 2013 at Kyoto University. Organizer: Takeshi Sakon.

Humans have always sought to change their environment—building houses, monuments, temples, and roads. In the process, they have remade the fabric of the world into newly functional objects that are also works of art to be admired. In this second edition of his popular Existential Pleasures of Engineering, Samuel Florman explores how engineers think and feel about their profession. A deeply insightful and refreshingly unique text, this book corrects the myth that engineering is cold and passionless. Indeed, Florman celebrates (...) engineering not only crucial and fundamental but also vital and alive he views it as a response to some of our deepest impulses, an endeavor rich in spiritual and sensual rewards. Opposing the "anti-technology" stance, Florman gives readers a practical, creative, and even amusing philosophy of engineering that boasts of pride in his craft. (shrink)

Samuel Rickless presents a new account of Berkeley's controversial argument, and suggests it is the philosopher's greatest legacy: not only is it valid, but it may well be sound.

Taking the title of his book from Isaiah Berlin's famous essay distinguishing a negative concept of liberty connoting lack of interference by others from a positive concept involving participation in the political realm, Samuel Fleischacker explores a third definition of liberty that lies between the first two. In Fleischacker's view, Kant and Adam Smith think of liberty as a matter of acting on our capacity for judgment, thereby differing both from those who tie it to the satisfaction of our (...) desires and those who translate it as action in accordance with reason or "will." Integrating the thought of Kant and Smith, and developing his own stand through readings of the Critique of Judgment and The Wealth of Nations, Fleischacker shows how different acting on one's best judgment is from acting on one's desires--how, in particular, good judgment, as opposed to mere desire, can flourish only in favorable social and political conditions. At the same time, exercising judgment is something every individual must do for him- or herself, hence not something that philosophers and politicians who reason better than the rest of us can do in our stead. For this reason advocates of a liberty based on judgment are likely to be more concerned than are libertarians to make sure that government provides people with conditions for the use of their liberty--for example, excellent standards of education, health care, and unemployment insurance--while at the same time promoting a less paternalistic view of government than most of the movements associated for the past thirty years with the political left. (shrink)

Taking a thematic approach to Butler as a political thinker, this text develops Butler's theory of the political through an exploration of her politics of troubling.

Over the past decade, Jacques Rancière’s writings have increasingly provoked and inspired political theorists who wish to avoid both the abstraction of so-called normative theories and the philosophical platitudes of so-called postmodernism. Rancière offers a new and unique definition of politics, la politique, as that which opposes, thwarts and interrupts what Rancière calls the police order, la police — a term that encapsulates most of what we normally think of as politics (the actions of bureaucracies, parliaments, and courts). Interpreters have (...) been tempted to read Rancière as proffering a formally pure conception of politics, wherein politics is ultimately separate from and in utter opposition to all police orders. Here I provide a different account of Rancière’s thinking of politics: for Rancière politics goes on within police orders and for this reason he strongly rejects the very idea of a pure politics. Politics is precisely that which could never be pure; politics is an act of impurity, a process that resists purification. In carefully delineating the politique—police relation I show that the terms of Rancière’s political writings are multiple and multiplied. Rancière consistently undermines any effort to render politics pure, and therein lies his potential contribution to contemporary political theory. (shrink)

Adam Smith was a philosopher before he ever wrote about economics, yet until now there has never been a philosophical commentary on the Wealth of Nations . Samuel Fleischacker suggests that Smith's vastly influential treatise on economics can be better understood if placed in the light of his epistemology, philosophy of science, and moral theory. He lays out the relevance of these aspects of Smith's thought to specific themes in the Wealth of Nations , arguing, among other things, that (...) Smith regards social science as an extension of common sense rather than as a discipline to be approached mathematically, that he has moral as well as pragmatic reasons for approving of capitalism, and that he has an unusually strong belief in human equality that leads him to anticipate, if not quite endorse, the modern doctrine of distributive justice. Fleischacker also places Smith's views in relation to the work of his contemporaries, especially his teacher Francis Hutcheson and friend David Hume, and draws out consequences of Smith's thought for present-day political and philosophical debates. The Companion is divided into five general sections, which can be read independently of one another. It contains an index that points to commentary on specific passages in Wealth of Nations . Written in an approachable style befitting Smith's own clear yet finely honed rhetoric, it is intended for professional philosophers and political economists as well as those coming to Smith for the first time. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks leveled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the paper is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, Kleingeld and (...) Nyholm: these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely, but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I take a detailed look at Furner’s work, work in which he seeks to revise (rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his more modest aims, Furner’s revision is also ill-founded. (shrink)

I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F is that which makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. These sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if (...) they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only Fs are Gs. I close by defining an asymmetric and irreflexive notion of analysis in terms of the reflexive and symmetric one. (shrink)

Modern notions of empathy often celebrate its ability to bridge divides, to unite humankind. But how do we square this with the popular view that we can never truly comprehend the experience of being someone else? In this book, Samuel Fleischacker delves into the work of Adam Smith to draw out an understanding of empathy that respects both personal difference and shared humanity. After laying out a range of meanings for the concept of empathy, Fleischacker proposes that what Smith (...) called “sympathy” is very much what we today consider empathy. Smith’s version has remarkable value, as his empathy calls for entering into the perspective of another—a uniquely human feat that connects people while still allowing them to define their own distinctive standpoints. After discussing Smith’s views in relation to more recent empirical and philosophical studies, Fleischacker shows how turning back to Smith promises to enrich, clarify, and advance our current debates about the meaning and uses of empathy. (shrink)

At the core of Kant's ethics lies the claim that if there is a supreme principle of morality then it cannot be a principle based on utilitarianism or Aristotelian perfectionism or the Ten Commandments. The only viable candidate for such a principle is the categorical imperative. This book is the most detailed investigation of this claim. It constructs a new, criterial reading of Kant's derivation of one version of the categorical imperative: the Formula of Universal Law. This reading shows this (...) derivation to be far more compelling than contemporary philosophers tend to believe. It also reveals a novel approach to deriving another version of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity, a principle widely considered to be the most attractive Kantian candidate for the supreme principle of morality. This book will be important not just for Kant scholars but for a broad swathe of students of philosophy. (shrink)

This book examines three issues: the principle of ought implies can ; the principle of alternate possibilities ; and Kant’s views on the duty to promote one’s own happiness. It argues that although Kant was wrong to deny such a duty, the part of his denial that rests on a conception of duty incorporating both OIC and PAP is sound.

There is a mystery at the heart of Plato's Parmenides. In the first part, Parmenides criticizes what is widely regarded as Plato's mature theory of Forms, and in the second, he promises to explain how the Forms can be saved from these criticisms. Ever since the dialogue was written, scholars have struggled to determine how the two parts of the work fit together. Did Plato mean us to abandon, keep or modify the theory of Forms, on the strength of Parmenides' (...) criticisms? Samuel Rickless offers something that has never been done before: a careful reconstruction of every argument in the dialogue. He concludes that Plato's main aim was to argue that the theory of Forms should be modified by allowing that forms can have contrary properties. To grasp this is to solve the mystery of the Parmenides and understand its crucial role in Plato's philosophical development. (shrink)

Bearing Society in Mind disrupts the disciplinary boundaries of economic, political and cultural theory by exploring the theory and politics of the social formation.

The concept of sustainable and responsible (SR) investments expresses that every investment should be based on the SR investor’s code of ethics. To a large extent the allocation of SR investments to more sustainable companies and ethical practices is based on the environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) scores provided by rating agencies. However, a thorough investigation of ESG scores is a neglected topic in the literature. This paper uses Thomson Reuters ASSET4 ESG ratings to analyze the influence of firm (...) size, a company’s available resources for providing ESG data, and the availability of a company’s ESG data on the company’s sustainability performance. We find a significant positive correlation between the stated variables, which can be explained by organizational legitimacy. The results raise the question of whether the way the ESG score measures corporate sustainability gives an advantage to larger firms with more resources while not providing SR investors with the information needed to make decisions based on their beliefs. Due to our results, SR investors and scholars should reopen the discussion about: what sustainability rating agencies measure with ESG scores, what exactly needs to be measured, and if the sustainable finance community can reach their self-imposed objectives with this measurement. (shrink)

It can be shown by means of a paradox that, given the Principle of Sufficient Reason, there is no conjunction of all contingent truths. The question is, or ought to be, how to interpret that result: _Quid sibi velit?_ A celebrated argument against PSR due to Peter van Inwagen and Jonathan Bennett in effect interprets the result to mean that PSR entails that there are no contingent truths. But reflection on parallels in philosophy of mathematics shows it can equally be (...) interpreted either as a proof that there are "too many" contingent truths to combine in a single conjunction or as a proof that the concept _contingent truth_ is indefinitely extensible and there is no such thing as "all contingent truths." Either interpretation would reconcile PSR with contingent truth, but the natural rationales of those interpretations are at odds. This essay argues that the second interpretation is a more satisfactory explanation of why, if PSR is true, there should be no conjunction of all contingent truths. This sheds new light on the nature of the explanatory demand embedded in PSR and uncovers a number of surprising implications for the commitments of rationalism. (shrink)

I have two main goals in this paper. The first is to argue for the thesis that Kant gave up on his highest good argument for the existence of God around 1800. The second is to revive a dialogue about this thesis that died out in the 1960s. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I reconstruct Kant’s highest good argument. In the second, I turn to the post-1800 convolutes of Kant’s Opus postumum to discuss his repeated (...) claim that there is only one way to argue for the existence of God, a way which resembles the highest good argument only in taking the moral law as its starting point. In the third, I explain why I do not find the counterarguments to my thesis introduced in the 1960s persuasive. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions offers the first book-length defence of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement (MRTJ). Although the theory was much maligned by Wittgenstein and ultimately rejected by Russell himself, Lebens shows that it provides a rich and insightful way to understand the nature of propositional content. In Part I, Lebens charts the trajectory of Russell’s thought before he adopted the MRTJ. Part II reviews the historical story of the theory: What led Russell to deny the (...) existence of propositions altogether? Why did the theory keep evolving throughout its short life? What role did G. F. Stout play in the evolution of the theory? What was Wittgenstein’s concern with the theory, and, if we can’t know what his concern was exactly, then what are the best contending hypotheses? And why did Russell give the theory up? In Part III, Lebens makes the case that Russell’s concerns with the theory weren’t worth its rejection. Moreover, he argues that the MRTJ does most of what we could want from an account of propositions at little philosophical cost. This book bridges the history of early analytic philosophy with work in contemporary philosophy of language. It advances a bold reading of the theory of descriptions and offers a new understanding of the role of Stout and the representation concern in the evolution of the MRTJ. It also makes a decisive contribution to philosophy of language by demonstrating the viability of a no-proposition theory of propositions. (shrink)

Mathematician and philosopher Hermann Weyl had our subject dead to rights.

In this paper I discuss the problem of the Kantian line. The problem arises because the locus of value in Kantian ethics is rationality, which (counterintuitively) seems to entail that there are no duties to groups of beings like children. I argue that recent attempts to solve this problem by Wood and O’Neill overlook an important aspect of it before posing my own solution.

In Human Morality, I attempt to do two things. The first is to distinguish carefully among questions concerning morality’s scope, content, authority, and deliberative role, and to emphasize the importance of addressing all four of these topics if we are to understand the relation between morality and the point of view of the individual agent. The second is to explore each of these topics myself, and, in so doing, to sketch one interpretation of the place of moral concerns in human (...) life. (shrink)

Two of the lead articles in this issue examine the emerging practice of organ procurement by normothermic regional perfusion (NRP) in terms of whether or not these patients are “dead” at the time t...

In the Paraplegia Case, we must choose either to preserve the life of a paraplegic for 10 years or that of someone in full health for the same duration. Non-consequentialists reject a benefit-maximising view, which holds that since the person in full health will have a higher quality of life, we ought to save him straightaway. In the Unequal Lifespan Case, we face a choice between saving one person for 5 years in full health and another for 25 years in (...) full health. Frances Kamm has recently unfurled an Equal Respect Argument in an effort to support the position that while we ought to give each person a 50% chance of being saved in the Paraplegia Case, we are morally permitted to save straightaway the person who would live longer in the Unequal Lifespan case. The article tries to show that a Kant-inspired account of the dignity of persons is far more successful than Kamm's argument in supporting this position. The Kant-inspired account owes this success to its conceiving of respect for persons not primarily as respect for their pursuit of what is of value for them, but rather as respect for the value in them. (shrink)

It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each (...) has the resources to resolve problems facing the other. (shrink)